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goods where consumers search for desired varieties but can observe product quality only
after consumption. The model yields price and welfare results that are contrary to those
for inspection goods. Specically, we nd that equilibrium price may rise even when search
intensity is higher and, under plausible conditions, both consumer and social welfare are
initially increasing in search cost. Our analysis shows that quality observability is a key
determinant of how search markets function.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Consumers often conduct costly search in order to nd price and product information.
The economics literature on consumer search, which is by now extensive, makes the standard
assumption that product quality is uncovered from search: the products are search or
inspectiongoods.1 However, in many situations, although consumers can nd price and
variety that match their needs through search, they are unable to observe product quality
before purchase. For instance, consumers could be searching for a product with desired
price and product features, such as a tour package at a certain destination, a specic
restaurant, or a particular-type of furniture; but the quality of the product is learned only
after consumption. Despite their prevalence, little is known about how search markets for
such experiencegoods operate. The purpose of this paper is to advance our understanding
in this regard.
We present a model in which rms produce di¤erentiated product varieties that may
also di¤er in quality. Consumers have heterogeneous preferences for variety but all prefer
a high-quality product (H) to a low-quality one (L). Product quality is stochastic: the
probability that a rms product is of high quality is  which may di¤er across rms
with a higher-quality rm having a higher : We thus draw a distinction between rm
quality () and product quality (q): The market operates for two time periods. At the
beginning of period 1, each rm can make a private investment to increase its quality, with
heterogeneous investment costs. Average rm quality in period 1 is determined by the
portion of rms that make the quality investment. Following the rst-period consumers
purchases, rms may establish reputation about their quality () to the next generation of
consumers.
In each period, once the set of active rms and their average quality is determined, they
simultaneously choose prices, followed by consumer search across rms. Each search, which
1Starting from the seminal work of Stigler (1961), the economics of consumer search has advanced in
the directions of searching for low price among homogeneous sellers (e.g., Stahl, 1989) or for desired variety
under horizontal di¤erentiation (e.g., Wolinsky, 1986). More recent search models have considered vertical
di¤erentiation where, however, product quality is revealed from search (see discussions later).
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costs s; enables a consumer to discover the match value of a rms product provided the
product is of high quality and its price. However, high- and low-quality products from the
same rm have the same appearance when searched by a consumer,2 and the quality of the
product is detected only after consumption.
We start with a preliminary analysis where the market has a given average rm quality.
In addition to its intrinsic interest, this provides the basis for the analysis with endogenous
rm quality. We show that there is a uniform-price equilibrium, where consumers conduct
(random) sequential search with a reservation value. The equilibrium has interesting sim-
ilarities and di¤erences as compared to that for inspection goods.3 The reservation value
is determined similarly as in models of search for horizontally di¤erentiated products (e.g.,
Wolinsky, 1986), adjusting for the fact that a match value is realized only if the product is
of high quality, the probability of which is given by the average rm quality in the market:
Remarkably, given the average rm quality, consumers have the same reservation value in
their search for experience and inspection goods. However, an increase in the average rm
quality has opposite e¤ects on the equilibrium price for the two types of goods: for both
of them a higher average rm quality will motivate consumers to search more intensively
(as if search were more e¢ cient), leading to intensied price competition; but for experi-
ence goods it has the additional e¤ect of making the demand for each rm less elastic, and
this demand e¤ect dominates the competition e¤ect under plausible conditions so that
equilibrium prices are higher,4 in contrast to the outcome for inspection goods.
We next return to the full analysis of our model with endogenous rm quality and repu-
tation. To capture the idea of rm reputation in an especially convenient way, we assume
that (some) period-1 consumers will make public their product reviews that are observed
2One natural interpretation for this is that an H product has no defect, whereas an L product contains
a hidden defect that decreaes the products value to the consumer.
3For inspection goods, a consumer will discover the quality of a rms product q = H or L when
searching the rm. An inspection good is otherwise the same as an experience good in our model. In
particular, in both cases a high-quality rm has a high :
4As we shall show, despite the higher prices, an increase in the averge rm quality in the market never-
theless will result in higher consumer and social welfare.
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by consumers in period 2, which enables the latter to infer the quality of a rm before
search. Then, because consumers will have higher expected surplus when searching rms
with higher average quality, in period 2 consumers will only search high-quality rms, even
though they still cannot detect product quality before purchase. Thus, a high-quality rm
will have a higher discounted sum of prots due to its reputation, which provides the in-
centive (return) for rms to improve quality early on.5 In equilibrium, a rm will invest
to become a high quality producer if and only if its investment cost realization does not
exceed some cuto¤ value. This cuto¤ determines the average rm quality in period 1, and
only high-quality rms will be active sellers in period 2. Consumer search and price com-
petition in both periods are then determined similarly as in the benchmark case. What is
most striking about the equilibrium is that search friction has non-monotonic impact on
consumer and social welfare: they both rst increase and eventually decrease in search cost.
An increase in search cost lowers search e¢ ciency (and price competition) under a given
average rm quality, but the resulting higher price and prot increase the return to being
a high quality rm, motivating more rms to invest in quality, leading to a higher average
rm quality in period 1. We demonstrate that, under plausible conditions, the quality ef-
fect dominates the search e¢ ciency e¤ect when search cost is (su¢ ciently) low while the
converse is true when search cost is relatively high.
Importantly, in our model if consumers were able to detect product quality before pur-
chase, then both consumer and social welfare would monotonically decrease in search cost.
For inspection goods, a higher search cost also increases average rm quality in period 1
by boosting the returns to reputation, despite reducing search e¢ ciency (and price com-
petition). Why, then, is the relationship between search cost and welfare sharply di¤erent
for the two types of goods? As we illuminate through our analysis, contrary to experi-
ence goods, for inspection goods consumers could avoid the utility loss from a low quality
product by not purchasing it; hence consumers searching for inspection goods do not gain
from a higher rm quality in a way as they would searching for experience goods. On
5 In experince-goods markets, it is well recognized that reputation can furnish incentives for rms to
provide high-quality products (e.g., Choi, 1998; Shapiro, 1983; Wernerfelt, 1988).
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the other hand, for both types of goods a higher search cost despite its indirect positive
impact through the higher average rm quality would reduce search e¢ ciency. Therefore,
as in the existing literature, for inspection goods an increase in search cost always harms
consumers and social welfare.
We further compare the market provision of product quality with the social optimum. We
show that equilibrium investment for product quality is (socially) decient when search cost
is low, which is consistent with the result from the economics literature on experience goods
where without search frictions rms typically invest too little in product quality (e.g.,
Riordan, 1986; Shapiro, 1982). However, we also nd that investment for product quality
can be socially excessive when search cost is relatively high. To understand this result,
notice that an increase in the number of rms that make quality investment will impact
welfare positively by boosting average rm quality in period 1 but negatively by raising total
investment cost. When s is low, consumers will nd high match values through search, and
they hence benet more from higher rm quality because a high match value is not realized
if product quality turns out to be low; but the private investment incentive is low due to
low prot from being a high-quality rm. Consequently, the market under-provides product
quality when search cost is low; and the opposite can be true when search cost is relatively
high.
We nally extend our model to analyze the role of an intermediary, which can list sellers
on its search platform by charging each of them a xed fee and a percentage of its revenue.
The intermediary can improve welfare by screening out low-quality sellers, especially when
it can commit to a relatively small listing space on the platform and hence charge a high
xed fee to a listing seller. The high xed fee deters the low-quality sellers who are unable
to earn repeat business, resulting in a separating equilibrium where only high-quality rms
will be active in period 1 (and also in period 2).6 However, if the intermediary is unable
to commit to a relatively small listing space on its search platform, then it is possible that
both high- and low-quality rms may pay the intermediarys optimally-chosen fees and be
6Notice that the intermediary can naturally serve as a carrier of sellersreputation, recording/publishing
consumersproduct reviews.
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active in period 1, whereas fewer rms will invest in quality because the intermediarys fee
lowers sellersinvestment return. In this case the intermediary will reduce welfare.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst model of sequential search for experience
goods. Wolinsky (1986) is an early contribution to the study of consumer search for hori-
zontally di¤erentiated products (for related contributions, see, e.g., Anderson and Renault,
1999; Armstrong et al., 2009; Haan and Moraga-González, 2011; Rhodes, 2011). Recent
papers have analyzed consumer search across vertically-di¤erentiated rms (e.g., Athey and
Ellison, 2011; Chen and He, 2011), under both horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation (e.g.,
Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011; Bar-Isaac et al., 2012; Chen and Zhang, 2018), or with investment
on product quality (e.g., Fishman and Levy, 2015; Moraga-González and Sun, 2019)7. All
of these and other studies on consumer search assume that product quality is known be-
fore consumers make purchases. Our model advances the literature in an important new
direction, and our results provide new perspectives on how search frictions impact market
performance.
The Internet, together with new information technology, has drastically reduced search
cost for many products. In the existing consumer search literature, reductions in search cost
generally benet consumers and increase social welfare. This is generally true even when
a lower search cost sometimes leads to higher market prices (e.g., Chen and Zhang, 2011;
Bar-Isaac et al., 2012; Zhou, 2014; Moraga-González, et al., 2017; Choi, et al., 2018), or
when it lowers product quality (e.g., Fishman and Levy, 2015; Moraga-González and Sun,
2019). Our model also suggests that there are important consumer and e¢ ciency benets
from reducing search frictions, but it cautions that for experience goods, (further) decreases
in search cost can actually reduce consumer and social welfare. In fact, in our model the
presence of some search friction is necessary in order for either consumer or social welfare
to be maximized.8
7Relatedly, Wolinsky (2005) and Moraga-González and Sun (2018) study consumer search models in
which sellers exert costly e¤orts to create service plans.
8This has an interesting connection to the result in Grossman and Stiglitz (1981) on the impossibility of
the informationally e¢ cient markets, even though our model and mechanism are very di¤erent from theirs.
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In the rest of the paper, we describe our model in section 2, analyze the benchmark under
a given average rm quality in section 3, and conduct the analysis with endogenous rm
quality and reputation in section 4. We extend the model to include a search intermediary
in section 5, and conclude in section 6. A numerical example is presented in the Appendix
to illustrate results.
2. THE MODEL
The market contains a unit mass of rms and operates for two periods, 1 and 2. A
rms product quality, q; can be either high (H) or low (L): The probability that a rms
product is of high or low quality is respectively  and 1   ; where  2 fH ; Lg and
0  l < h  1: Initially, all rms have  = l; but at the beginning of period 1, each rm
can privately make a one-time investment that costs x; to permanently increase its quality
from l to h; where x is a privately-observed random draw from distribution G (x) ; with
density g (x) > 0 on [0; x] for some x 2 (0;1) : Each rms quality () is then determined
and remains as the rms private information. Production cost is normalized to zero.
In each period, a distinct unit mass of consumers are present in the market. Each con-
sumer desires to purchase one unit of the product. A consumers valuation of an H product
is u; which is a random draw from cumulative distribution function F (u) ; and her valuation
of an L product is normalized to zero. Hence rms are di¤erentiated both horizontally and
vertically, respectively because each consumers u is independently drawn across rms and
because a high-quality rm ( = h) is more likely to produce a high-quality product. We
assume that F (u) has corresponding density f (u) > 0 on [0; u] ; with 0 < u <1.
To focus on experience goods, we assume that an H product and an L product from
the same rm have the same appearance. Each consumer needs to search a rm in order
to discover the realization of her u for the rms product provided its quality is H and
the rms price; but she learns the quality of the product only after purchase, with the
purchased good consumed in the same period. Each search costs the consumer s > 0. In
each period, rms simultaneously and independently choose prices, after which consumers
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may conduct sequential search and make purchases. To capture the idea that rms can
establish quality reputation, we assume that consumers of period 1 will furnish product
reviews about whether q = H or L for each rms product.9 In period 2, a new cohort
of consumers, who replace the rst-period consumers, can observe these product reviews
before conducting searches. Values in period 2, when discounted to period 1, have a common
discount factor  > 0:10
A rms strategy species its investment decision based on its investment cost x and its
prices p1 and p2 (possibly contingent on its ) in the two periods. A period-1 consumers
strategy species her search and purchase decisions, whereas period-2 consumers may base
these decisions also on observed product reviews. At a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, each
rms strategy maximizes its discounted sum of prot, holding beliefs about other rms
and consumersstrategies; each consumers strategy maximizes her surplus (at any point of
her sequential decision process), holding beliefs about rmsqualities and prices; and beliefs
are consistent with strategies along the equilibrium path.
One desirable feature of our model is that it can be readily adapted to the study of
inspection goods; in fact, if consumers were able to observe product quality (q) when
searching the rm, our model would become one of search for inspection goods. In the case
of inspection goods, we may interpret  as the probability that the rms product meets
each consumers needs, so that a higher quality rm whose product possibly has broader
appeal to consumers has a higher ; as in Chen and He (2011). Our formulation allows
us to compare results for experience and inspection goods in a unied framework, and to
clarify how product quality observability matters for the functioning of search markets.
We analyze our model in two steps. First, as a benchmark, we study in section 3 consumer
search and price competition in a single period of our model in which given portions of G
and 1   G rms respectively have  = h and  = l, for G 2 [0; 1]. This analysis has its
9Our analysis will be the same whether all period-1 consumers or a randomly-drawn portion of them will
publically reveal their product experiences. For ease of exposition, we assume all of them will.
10We can consider period 2 as combining all possible future periods after period 1 for which rms have
established quality reputation, in which case  could be higher than 1.
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independent interest, and it will provide the basis for the full analysis of our model with
endogenous G and with two periods in section 4.
3. SEARCH AND PRICE UNDER GIVEN AVERAGE FIRM QUALITY
Consider a single period of our model, in which a given G 2 [0; 1] portion of rms have
 = h: The average rm quality in the market is then also given:
 = Gh + (1 G)l: (1)
For given ; we rst consider consumers search strategy. As in search models for in-
spection goods in which rms are horizontally and vertically di¤erentiated (e.g., Eliaz and
Spiegler, 2011; Chen and Zhang, 2018), we focus on a uniform-price equilibrium where all
rms charge the same price p ; and shall we discuss the motivation for this equilibrium
when characterizing p later: Each consumers equilibrium search strategy, holding belief
p , solves the following dynamic search problem:
V = max
u
(
 s+ [1  F (u)]
R u
u
(u  p) f (u) du
[1  F (u)] + F (u)V
)
; (2)
where V is a consumers (maximized) continuation value from searching a randomly-
selected rm whose expected quality and price are respectively  and p : The consumer
will sequentially and randomly search sellers, and will purchase when nding a seller whose
products value u reaches her optimal reservation value u (provided the sellers price is
indeed p): Each search costs s; and, under reservation value u ; the search will lead to
a purchase with probability [1  F (u)] while the consumer will search again to receive
continuation value V with probability F (u) : The consumers optimal reservation value
u thus satises the rst-order condition:
  (u   p) f (u) + f (u)V = 0:
It follows that the consumers continuation value, which is also the surplus for a consumer
to engage in search or to participate in the market, is
V = u   p ; (3)
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and in equilibrium V  0 for consumersparticipation in the market. Combining (2) and
(3), we obtain
s =   [1  F (u)]V +
Z u
u
(u  p) f (u) du ,
which can be re-stated as the following condition for the optimal reservation value in search:

Z u
u
(u  u) f (u) du = s: (4)
The left-hand side of equation (4) is the consumers expected benet from one more search
when she is currently at a seller with u , which decreases in u ; while s is the marginal
cost of the extra search. The condition extends the optimal search rule for horizontally
di¤erentiated products (e.g., Wolinsky, 1986), which is a special case of equation (4) when
 = 1: As we clarify shortly, when s < s which we shall assume for some positive number
s, there exists a unique u 2 (0; u) that solves (4) and indeed V > 0.
Consider next the pricing strategy by rms. At the proposed uniform-price equilibrium,
consumers will have reservation value u at any rm she searches that charges price p ;
holding the equilibrium belief that all rms have expected quality  and price p : Now
suppose that a rm deviates to a price p: The consumers purchase decision at this rm will
partly depend on her belief about the rms ; as well as on her belief about other rms
prices and qualities following the deviation. The concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
which we adopt, does not constrain beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path, potentially resulting in
multiple equilibria. To overcome this well-known di¢ culty in dynamic games of imperfect
information, we assume that consumers hold passive belief o¤ the equilibrium path: at
the deviating rm with price p; each consumer believes that (i) the rm deviating to price
p continues to have the expected quality ; and (ii) any other rm continues to charge price
p with expected quality :
Part (ii) of the passive belief follows from the standard assumption in consumer search for
di¤erentiated products (e.g., Wolinsky, 1986), where following the deviation by one rm the
other rms are expected to continue with the equilibrium price; and the expected quality
of any such rm would then continue to be . Part (i) of the assumption is motivated
by the following consideration. In our model, if a price deviation is protable for one 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type, it must be equally protable for the other  type. Thus, if the consumer believes the
expected quality of the deviating rm to be, say, B (p; p) ; this belief can be consistent with
protable deviation only if B (p; p) = . It is thus reasonable to assume that, observing
a deviating price p; consumers will hold belief B (p; p) = : In other words, we require
consumerso¤-equilibrium belief to be consistent with rmsincentives: B (p; p) is equal
to the expected quality of rms that can (weakly) benet from the deviation.11
Under passive belief, the consumer, who has arrived at a rm with price p and value u,
will purchase from the rm if
u  p  u   p  0:
Thus, the demand for the rm with price p from any visiting consumer, given that all other
rms charge p ; is
D (p; p) = 1  F

u + p  p


;
with D (p ; p) = 1 F (u) : The prot for a rm of quality  from any visiting consumer,
 (p; p) = pD (p; p) ; is maximized when p satises
@ (p; p)
@p
= 1  F

u + p  p


  p1

f

u + p  p


= 0:
At the uniform-price equilibrium, p = p ; and
p = 
1  F (u)
f (u)
: (5)
Moreover, if 1  F (u) is log-concave, or, equivalently, the inverse hazard rate is (weakly)
decreasing:
0 (u)  0 for  (u)  1  F (u)
f (u)
; (6)
11 In the literature on experience goods, rms can sometimes signal their quality through price and other
devices (e.g., Choi, 1998; Riordan, 1988; Shapiro, 1983; Wernerfelt, 1988). In our model, given their qualities,
rms are symmetric in all other aspects and there exist no signals that could potentially separate them. We
will show formally in Proposition 1 below that there can be no separatingequilibrium in our model for a
given .
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then  (p; p) is single-peaked at p ; the uniform-price equilibrium with p = p exists
uniquely, and p is (weakly) lower when consumers search more intensively (i.e., u is
higher). Moreover, at the unique p ;
V = u   p = u    (u) =  [u    (u)] :
The highest possible search cost (s) and its corresponding (lowest possible) reservation value
(u0) are dened as
s  
Z u
u0
(u  u0) f (u) du; where u0  1  F (u0)
f (u0)
: (7)
Then, for any s < s; there is a unique u 2 (0; u) that solves (4) and V > 0; so that
consumers will indeed engage in search when average rm quality in the market is  2
[l; h] : We shall maintain assumptions (6) and s < s throughout the paper.
In equilibrium, each rms prot is
 =
X
i
[F (u)]
i pD (p ; p) =  (u) ;
where [F (u)]
i is the number of consumers for whom the seller is their is visit. We measure
consumer welfare and social welfare respectively by aggregate consumer surplus and total
surplus. With a unit measure of consumers and of rms, industry prot, consumer welfare
and social welfare, for a market with average rm quality ; are respectively:
 =  (u) ; V =  [u    (u)] ; W = u : (8)
The result below summarizes the above discussions and further establishes that there can
be no equilibrium in which rms with di¤erent  charge di¤erent prices. At a potential
separating equilibriumwhere h and l rms respectively charge ph 6= pl; following a
deviating price p in the (small) neighborhoods of ph or pl; an assumption analogous to
passive belief under the uniform-price equilibrium is that consumers believe the deviation
to have been made by a h or l rm, respectively.
Proposition 1 There is a unique uniform-price equilibrium in the experience-goods market
where average rm quality is : At the equilibrium, consumers search sequentially with
12
reservation value u and each rm charges price p. Moreover, there can be no equilibrium
where h and l rms respectively charge ph 6= pl; if consumers believe that a deviating
price p in the neighborhoods of ph or pl is respectively made by a h or l rm.
12
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that there can be no equilibrium where h and l rms charge
di¤erent prices. Suppose, to the contrary, that there is an equilibrium where h and l
rms charge ph 6= pl: Then the equilibrium prot for the two types of rms must be equal,
h = l; because otherwise a rm of the type with a lower prot, say, l; can deviate to
ph and increase its prot. So suppose ph 6= pl but h = l: We show that this leads to a
contradiction.
Let each consumers reservation values be uh and ul at a h- and l-rm, respectively.
Then, since the consumer has the same continuation value at both types of rms, we have
huh   ph = lul   pl: (9)
Moreover, reservation values uh and ul satisfy the following equation
G
Z u
uh
h (u  uh) f (u) du+ (1 G)
Z u
ul
l (u  ul) f (u) du = s; (10)
in which the LHS is the expected gain from one more search: When the consumer is currently
at a h-rm (having uh and ph), with probability G she will encounter another h-rm with
gain (hu  ph)  (huh   ph) = h (u  uh) ; conditional on her u > uh from the new rm
searched, while with probability (1 G) the consumer will encounter a l-rm with gain
(lu  pl)   (huh   ph) ; which equals l (u  ul) from (9), conditional on u > ul: The
argument is similar when the consumer is currently at a h-rm (having ul and pl).
Next, given consumerssearch behavior and the pricing strategies of other rms, if a h
rm deviates with price p in the neighborhoods of ph; under our assumption consumers will
believe that the deviation is made by the h rm. Hence, at the deviating price p; a consumer
12Our result that no separating equilibrium can exist also holds if, following a deviating price p at the
proposed separating equilibrium, consumers believe that the deviating rm has quality ; or, more generally,
their o¤-equilibrium beliefs are respectively h or l for a deviating price p in the neighborhoods of ph or
pl, with h  l and h=h  l=l:
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with value u at the h rm will purchase if hu p  (G) [huh   ph]+(1 G) [lul   pl] =
huh   ph: The rms demand from any visiting consumer is thus 1   F

uh +
p ph
h

:
Solving maxp p
h
1  F

uh +
p ph
h
i
; with p = ph in equilibrium, we obtain ph = h (uh) :
Similarly, pl = l (ul) : Therefore
huh   ph = h [uh    (uh)] ; lul   pl = l [ul    (ul)] ;
and from (9) we obtain
h [uh    (uh)] = l [ul    (ul)] : (11)
Furthermore:
h =
ph [1  F (uh)]
1  (G)F (uh)  (1 G)F (ul) ; l =
pl [1  F (ul)]
1  (G)F (uh)  (1 G)F (ul) : (12)
If ph > pl, then h = l implies uh > ul; which further implies h [uh    (uh)] >
l [ul    (ul)] since 0 ()  0: This contradicts (11). If ph = h (uh) < pl = l (ul) ;
then from h > l and 
0 ()  0 we have uh  ul and hence
huh   h (uh) > lul   l (ul) ;
again contradicting (11).
A separatingequilibrium with di¤erent prices for di¤erent  types cannot exist in our
model, because there is nothing to enable such separation. Given average rm quality,
the equilibrium in our search model of experience goods is essentially unique and is the
uniform-price equilibrium.13
3.2 Impacts of Search Cost and Average Firm Quality
We next consider how the equilibrium may vary as search cost s or average rm quality
 changes. From (4), consumersreservation value, u ; increases in  and decreases in s:
Because p =  (u) and 0 ()  0; it follows from (8) that, given ; p and  increase
13Search models are known to contain an equilibrium where all rms charge very high prices and no
consumer engages in search. We do not consider such uninterestingequilibrium.
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in s whereas V and W decrease in s: Intuitively, a higher search cost reduces consumer
search e¢ ciency, which not only reduces consumers reservation value in search but also
lessens competition and raises price. The higher price and lower search e¢ ciency reduce
consumer surplus, and the lower search e¢ ciency also reduces social welfare; whereas higher
price boosts prot.
From (8), clearly V and W increase in ; the average quality of rms in the market.
The e¤ects of  on price (and prot) are less obvious, as we can see from
@p
@
=  (u) + 
0 (u)
@u
@
;
where the rst and the second terms on the RHS reect, respectively, the positive (direct)
demand e¤ect and the negative (indirect) search e¤ect on p from an increase in : A higher
 lowers the price elasticity of demand for given u14:
 =  @D (p; p)
@p
p
D

p=p
=
p
 (u)
;
which positively impact price; but it also increases the search reservation value u and
negatively impacts p due to 0 (u)  0: Because
@u
@
=
R u
u
[1  F (u)] du
 [1  F (u)] <
u  u

;
a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for @p@ > 0 is
1
u  u   
0 (u)
 (u)
; (13)
which holds, for example, if F (u) is a uniform or exponential distribution: The proceeding
discussions lead to the following:
Corollary 1 In equilibrium: (i) given average rm quality , price and prot increase,
while consumer and social welfare decrease, in search cost s; (ii) given s; a higher  leads to
higher price and prot if (13) holds, even though it intensies search and price competition
(i.e., u is higher and  (u) lower); moreover, V and W also increase in .
14When  is higher, the quality-adjusted price p

is lower and a marginal change in p is associated with
less change in p

and hence leads to less change in the quantity demanded.
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With exogenously-given rm quality for experience goods, the e¤ects of search friction
on price and welfare are similar to those in search markets for inspection goods.15 Notably,
p increases in  under (13), despite increased consumer search and price competition; this
is in contrast to the result under search for inspection goods, which we turn to next.
3.3 Comparing with Search for Inspection Goods
To make comparison, we now consider inspection goods by assuming that, when searching
a rm, a consumer will learn whether the rms q is H or L; in addition to uncovering its
price and u. Everything else is the same as in subsection 3.1. In particular,  2 fl; hg
continues to be a rms quality and remains to be its private information, with  being
the average rm quality in the market as dened in (1). We again look for a uniform-price
equilibrium, where each rm charges price pI : As in subsection 3.1, consumers optimal
search follows a reservation-value strategy, with the optimal reservation value uI satisfying

Z u
uI
 
u  uI

f (u) du = s:
Interestingly, this condition is identical to condition (4) for experience goods. This is
because when arriving at a rm with u = uI = u ; the expected marginal benet of an
additional search is the same under inspection and experience goods.16 In other words,
given  and s; u = uI :
To determine the demand for each rm, suppose a rm deviates with price p: The passive
belief assumption is now needed only for its part (ii) other rmsprice is still pI because
when searching the rm a consumer learns its product quality q: A visiting consumer will
purchase from the rm if she nds q = H (which occurs with the rms probability ) and
u  p  uI   pI :
15As we shall show in section 4, under endogenous rm quality and reputation, search costs have rather
surprising welfare e¤ects for experience goods, in contrast to those for inspection goods.
16However, as we shall see shortly, equilibrium consumer and social welfare are both higher for inspection
than for experience goods, because for the former consumers can detect and hence avoid the utility loss from
consuming a low quality product. In other words, consuming an L product, which has u = 0; is as if the
consumer did not search optimally; and hence welfare is lower for experience goods.
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The rms demand from any visiting consumer is thus
DI
 
p; pI

= 

1  F  uI + p  pI1 ;
and it chooses p to maximize pDI
 
p; pI

; which, in equilibrium, leads to
pI =
1  F  uI
f
 
uI
 =   uI :
Since a random visit by a consumer to a rm will on average result in a purchase with
probability 

1  F  uI ; and since all consumers whose total mass is one purchase;
the equilibrium output of a rm with quality  is
DI(pI ;pI)
[1 F (uI)] =

 ; and hence the rms
equilibrium prot is I () = 
 
uI

. Thus, a rm will have a higher prot than an
average rm if its quality  is higher than the market average, in contrast to the case of
experience goods where a rms equilibrium prot is independent of its .
Notice that the price elasticity of demand here is independent of ; in contrast to that
for experience goods, which explains why pI does not depend on  but p does. Therefore,
for inspection goods it is always true that
@pI
@
= 0
 
uI
 @uI
@
 0;
in contrast to @p@ > 0 for experience goods under condition (13).
In equilibrium, industry prot, consumer surplus, and total welfare are respectively
I = 
 
uI

; V I = u
I
   
 
uI

; W I = u
I . (14)
Since uI = u ; comparing p
I
 with p and (14) with (8), we have:
Proposition 2 Given  and s; consumers search with the same reservation value for in-
spection and experience goods, but V , , and W are all lower for the latter. Higher  leads
to higher p for experience goods under condition (13) but to lower p for inspection goods.
Moreover, a rms prot increases in its  under inspection goods but is independent of its
 under experience goods.
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For inspection goods, a higher average rm quality () in the market implies that con-
sumers will have higher expected benet from a search, because they are more likely to
nd an H-product. This boosts consumerssearch incentive, as reected by their higher
search reservation value, which increases competition and leads to lower equilibrium price.
Because consumers can detect product quality before purchase, an increase in  will not
a¤ect a consumers demand for a rm. By contrast, for experience goods, product quality
can be detected only after consumption, and thus higher  also increases a consumers ex-
pected utility from the product and hence the demand for it. Consequently, while a higher
average rm quality similarly imposes a downward pressure on equilibrium price by raising
consumerssearch reservation value as for inspection goods, it has the additional demand
e¤ect that, on balance, results in higher equilibrium price under condition (13).
4. ENDOGENOUS FIRM QUALITY AND REPUTATION
We now return to our model with endogenous rm quality and reputation. Notice that
if it is protable for a rm with a higher x to make the quality investment, it must also be
protable for a rm with a lower x to do so. The equilibrium of our model will thus have
the property that, for some threshold t; a rm will invest x to have h if x  t but will have
l without the investment if x > t: We assume that x is high enough so that in equilibrium
t < x; i.e., some rms (with su¢ ciently high realizations of x) will not incur x:
4.1 Market Equilibrium
For a given t; the average rm quality () in the market is
 =  (t)  G (t)h + [1 G (t)]l:
The rst-period equilibrium is then the same as in our preliminary analysis of section 3
with  =  (t), where consumers conduct sequential search with reservation value u and
all rms charge equilibrium price p1 = p :
In the second period, consumers will observe product reviews from period-1 consumers.
18
For a rm of quality , a portion  of its period-1 customers experienced quality H for
its product. Thus, from the product reviews, period-2 consumers can correctly infer each
rms :17 There will thus e¤ectively be two distinguishable segments of competing rms,
one having quality h and another l: Comparing V from (8) for  = h and  = l;
consumers will clearly receive a higher surplus from and thus only search the segment
of rms with  = h. It follows that only h rms will be active sellers in the market in
period 2, and consumers will search them with reservation value uh  uh (s) that uniquely
solves
h
Z u
uh
(u  uh) f (u) du = s: (15)
Moreover, in equilibrium all h rms charge price
p2 = h
1  F (uh)
f (uh)
= h (uh) ; (16)
and each earns prot
2 (h) =
h (uh)
G (t)
;
where G (t) is the mass of h rms in the market. Firms with l earn zero prot in period
2.
We next consider the investment choices of rms and determine the threshold t on in-
vestment cost x: Given that rms invest x if and only x  t, if a rm with x acquires h at
the beginning of period 1, it will earn discounted sum of prot
h =  (u) + 
h (uh)
G (t)
  x: (17)
By contrast, if the rm chooses to maintain l without the investment, its expected prot
is
l =  (u) : (18)
The equilibrium t = t  t (s) is determined by the x at which h = l; or
h (uh) = t
G (t) : (19)
17We could allow product reviews to be noisy signals or consumer observations of product reviews in period
2 to be noisy signals as well. Our results will remain valid if the noisy signals are su¢ ciently accurate.
19
Because average rm quality
   (t) = hG (t) + l [1 G (t)] (20)
is endogenous, we modify the denition of s in (7) by re-deningZ u
u0
(u  u0) f (u) du = s
 (t (s))
; (21)
where u0   (u0) = 1 F (u0)f(u0) ; to ensure consumer participation whenever s < s:18 Following
the discussions above, we establish the result below by further showing the existence of t
that solves equation (19).19
Proposition 3 Given s < s; our model has an equilibrium where a rm has  = h if and
only if its x  t = t (s) ; and the average rm quality in period 1 is  (t). Consumers
search with reservation value u and pay price p1 in period 1, but search only h rms with
reservation value uh and pay p2 in period 2.
Proof. The RHS of equation (19) increases in t; whereas the LHS of equation (19) is
larger than the RHS when t ! 0: Moreover, dene t as
h (uh (s)) = tG (t) : (22)
Since  (uh) weakly increases in s; we have h (uh (s))  tG (t) for all s 2 (0; s) : Thus,
the LHS of equation (19) is no higher than the RHS when t ! t. Therefore, there exists
t 2 (t; t) that solves equation (19):
The second-period industry prot, consumer surplus, and social welfare are respectively
2 = h (uh) ; V

2 = h (uh) ; W

2 = uh;
where we dene  (u)  [u   (u)] ; with  (u) > 0 and 0 (u)  1: Their corresponding
18As we shall discuss shortly, s
(t(s)) is likely to be monotonically increasing in s: If it is not, there might
be multiple s that satises (21), in which case we dene s to be the smallest s among them.
19 If  (u) is strictly decreasing, then t is unique.
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discounted sums for the two periods are given by:
 =  (u) + h (uh) 
Z t
0
xdG (x) ; (23)
V  =  (u) + h (uh) ; (24)
W  = u + huh  
Z t
0
xdG (x) : (25)
In equilibrium, each consumer receives positive (expected) surplus from market partici-
pation, and all rms receive positive prots, while the more e¢ cient rms (with lower x;
for x < t) receive higher prots.
4.2 Welfare E¤ects of Search Cost
We now consider the welfare e¤ects of search cost. Utilizing @uh@s =   1h[1 F (uh)] from
(15);
@p2
@s
= h
0 (uh)
@uh
@s
=   
0 (uh)
[1  F (uh)]  0:
Thus, as expected, a higher search cost leads to a higher price in period 2. Since
@t
@s
=
H
0 (uh) @uh@s
G (t) + tg (t)
=
 0 (uh)
G (t) + tg (t)
1
[1  F (uh)]  0; (26)
and @(t
)
@t = G
0 (t) (h   l) > 0; we have
@ (t)
@s
=
@ (t)
@t
@t
@s
 0:
Thus, increases in search cost raise average rm quality.20 Intuitively, when s is higher,
price is higher, and a rm has higher prot in period 2 for being a h rm. That is, the
return to the reputation of being a high quality rm is higher. This motivates more rms
to invest in h; so that t
 becomes higher, which boosts  in period 1.
When  is given exogenously, a higher s leads to a lower u ; which in turn results in
higher price and prot. With endogenous ; changes in s also impact  =  (t) : While a
higher s directly impacts u negatively, it indirectly impacts u positively through a higher
20Notice that if 0 (u) = 0; then @t=@s = 0; and hence @ (t) =@s = 0: Thus 0 (u) < 0 is needed in order
for average rm quality to (strictly) increase with s:
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:We expect that the direct e¤ect of s would outweigh its indirect e¤ect through ; so that
s
 is higher with a higher s: Dene the elasticity of average seller quality, ; with respect to
search cost as " = s
@
@s =
s

@
@t
@t
@s  0: Then
d

s


ds
=
   s@@s
2
 0 () "  @
@s
s

 1:
Thus, if "  1; then
@u
@s
=
@u
@ (s=)
@ (s=)
@s
=
"  1
 [1  F (u)]  0; (27)
@p
@s
= 0 (u)
@u
@s
 0;
and, since h
0 (uh) @uh@s = [t
g (t) +G (t)] @t

@s from totally di¤erentiating the two sides
of (19), we have
@
@s
=
@p
@s
+ h
0 (uh)
@uh
@s
  tg (t) @t

@s
=
@p
@s
+G (t)
@t
@s
 0:
The discussions above lead to:
Remark 1  (t) and p2 increase in s, and so do p1 and ; provided 
0 (u) < 0 and "  1.
Thus, with endogenous rm quality and reputation, search cost continues to be a key
indicator of competition intensity, with increases in s leading to less competition and high
prices in both periods. However, as we show next, search cost now has unconventional
e¤ects on consumer surplus and welfare. The result below refers to assumption
 M < 0 (u) < 0 for some M > 0 and for u 2 [0; u] ; (28)
which strengthens condition (6). Condition (28) is satised, for instance, if F (u) is a
uniform distribution, but it rules out the boundary case of the exponential distribution.
Proposition 4 (i) Under condition (28), both V  and W  increase in s when s is su¢ -
ciently small. (ii) Suppose "  1: Then, when s! s; V  decreases in s; and so does W  if
u0 (h   l)  t:
22
Proof. (i) First, from (24),
@V 
@s
=
@
@s
 (u) + 
0 (u)
@u
@s
+ h
0 (uh)
@uh
@s
:
Since @u@(s=) =   1[1 F (u)] from (4) and from (26):
@
@s
=
@
@t
@t
@s
= (h   l) g (t)
 0 (uh)
G (t) + tg (t)
1
[1  F (uh)] :
With @u@s =
" 1
[1 F (u)] from (27) and
@(s=)
@s =
1 "
 , we then have
@V 
@s
= (h   l) g (t)
 0 (uh)
G (t) + tg (t)
 (u)
[1  F (uh)] +
0 (u) ("  1)
[1  F (u)]   
0 (uh)
[1  F (uh)](29)
 1
[1  F (uh)]
24(h   l)  0 (uh) (u)G(t)
g(t) + t

  0 (u)  0 (uh)
35 ;
where the inequality holds because "  0 and [1  F (u)]  [1  F (uh)] : When s ! 0:
G(t)
g(t) ! 0; uh ! u; u ! u; 0 (u) < 0;  (u)! u; and (h   l)  
0(uh)(u)
G(t)
g(t)
+t
!1: Thus,
since 0 (u) = 1  0 (u) is bounded for any u; we have @V @s > 0 as s! 0:
Next, from (25),
@W 
@s
=
@
@s
u + 
@u
@s
+ h
@uh
@s
  tg (t) @t

@s
= [u (h   l)  t] g (t)
@t
@s
+ ("  1) 1
1  F (u)   
1
1  F (uh)
= [u (h   l)  t]
 0 (uh)
t + G(t
)
g(t)
1
1  F (uh) + ("  1)
1
1  F (u)   
1
1  F (uh)
>
1
1  F (uh)
8<:[u (h   l)  t]  0 (uh)t + G(t)g(t)   1  
9=; ;
where the last inequality is due to "  0 and u  uh: When s ! 0; t ! 0; G(t
)
g(t) ! 0;
u ! u; and hence [u (h   l)  t]  
0(uh)
t+G(t
)
g(t)
!1: Thus @W @s > 0 as s! 0:
(ii) First, @uh@s < 0; 
0 (u)  0; @u@s  0 if "  1; and, when s! s;  (u) = [u    (u)]!
0: Hence, from (29), if "  1; @V @s < 0 as s! s:
Next, when s! s; u ! u0; t ! t; and hence @W @s < 0 if
t  u0 (h   l) and "  1: (30)
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Therefore, higher search frictions can improve market performance for experience goods.
To understand this striking result, notice that the e¤ect of a marginal increase in s on
consumer surplus can be decomposed as follows under conditions (28) and "  1:
@V 
@s
=
@
@s
 (u)| {z }
average rm quality e¤ect >0
+ 0 (u)
@u
@s| {z }
search e¢ ciency e¤ect in period 1 0
+ h
0 (uh)
@uh
@s| {z }
search e¢ ciency e¤ect in period 2 <0
:
An increase in s raises the prot from being a h rm, motivating more rms to invest in
quality and hence  is higher in period 1. A higher s thus increases average rm quality
in period 1. On the other hand, a higher s reduces uh and, when "  1; also reduces u ;
that is, a higher search cost reduces search e¢ ciency and leads to lower reservation values,
which negatively impacts consumer surplus.
When search cost is low, price is low. Thus consumer surplus from an H product,  (u) ;
is high, and the number of high quality rms (that incur x) is small. In such situations,
although a marginal increase in s raises prices only marginally, the prot increase from
becoming a high quality rm is large because a h rm will have high sales in period 2.
Hence, a marginal increase in s leads to a large increase in the number of high quality rms
and in  (i.e., @@s is high), which means that
@
@s (u) is high, whereas the e¤ect on search
e¢ ciency is more moderate. Thus the average rm quality e¤ect dominates when s is small.
On the other hand, when s is large, price is high. Thus @@s and  (u) are relatively low, so
that the negative search e¢ ciency e¤ect dominates.
We can similarly decompose the e¤ect of search cost on welfare as follows:
@W 
@s
=
@
@s
u| {z }
average rm quality e¤ect > 0
+ 
@u
@s
+ h
@uh
@s| {z }
search e¢ ciency e¤ect < 0
+   tg (t) @t

@s| {z }
investment cost e¤ect < 0
:
In addition to the average rm quality and search e¢ ciency e¤ects, as in the case of consumer
surplus, for W  there is the additional e¤ect of investment cost: a higher search cost
increases the total investment cost for h; because the higher prot from being a high-
quality rm from an increase in s leads to more rms to invest in h: But when s ! 0;
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t ! 0; and thus the additional e¤ect of investment cost vanishes so that W  increases
in s; similarly as for V : On the other hand, when s ! s, the highest possible value of
search cost; t ! t and u ! u0: If u0 (h   l) < t; then the investment cost e¤ect (alone)
dominates the average rm quality e¤ect; and hence W  decreases in s; similarly as for V :
Our nding that both consumer and total welfare are initially increasing in search cost is
in sharp contrast to the result in the existing search literature, where consumer and social
welfare monotonically decrease as search cost increases. Both endogenous rm quality and
the experience nature of goods are important for the non-monotonic result in our model. If
average rm quality in the market () is exogenously given, higher search costs would only
have the negative e¤ect of reducing search e¢ ciency. In our model, an increase in search
cost has the additional e¤ect of inducing a higher ; which positively impacts consumer and
social welfare, and it is the dominant force when search cost is low. However, if the goods
were inspection goods, even with endogenous product quality, both consumer and social
welfare would decrease with search cost, as we show next.
4.3 Comparing to Welfare for Inspection Goods
For inspection goods, same as in the case of experience goods, for a given t the average
rm quality in the market is
 =  (t) = G (t)h + [1 G (t)]l:
The rst-period equilibrium is then the same as in subsection 3.3, with consumers conduct-
ing sequential search under reservation value uI = u and all rms charging p
I
1 = p
I
 : Notice
that a rm of quality  earns prot 
 
uI

in period 1.
Suppose also that, as for experience goods, in period 2 consumers can observe rst-period
consumersproduct reviews, which reveal each rms :21 Then, in period 2, consumers will
21Since consumers observe q 2 fH;Lg when searching a rm, they will only purchase if q = H: A
consumers review in this case is still about whether a rms product quality q is H or L; even though she
does not purchase if the produt quality turns out to be low, the consumer has wasted a costly search if
q = L.
25
also only search h rms, with reservation value uh: Moreover, from subsection 3.3, h
sellers will charge pI2 =  (uh) ; each earning prot
1
G(t) (uh) in period 2 if the number of
h rms is G (t) : Thus, a h seller earns higher prots in both periods.
In equilibrium, a rm will invest in h if and only if x   ; where the cuto¤ value  is
determined by
h


 
uI

+ 
1
G ()
 (uh)   = l


 
uI

;
or
 =
h   l
 ()
 (u) + 
1
G ()
 (uh) : (31)
Thus, same as for experience goods, a higher s; which increases  (u) and  (uh) ; will raise
average rm quality  () : Industry prot, consumer surplus, and social welfare for the two
periods together are respectively
I =  (u)+ (uh) 
Z 
0
xdG (x) ; V I =  (u)+ (uh) ; W
I = u+uh 
Z 
0
xdG (x) ;
where we recall  (u) = u   (u) :
The e¤ect of search cost on consumer welfare under inspection goods is always negative
(provided "  1 so that d

s


=ds  0), because the positive average rm quality e¤ect for
experience goods is absent:
@V I
@s
= 0 (u)
@u
@s| {z }
search e¢ ciency e¤ect in period 1 0
+ 0 (uh)
@uh
@s| {z }
search e¢ ciency e¤ect in period 2 <0
< 0:
Similarly,
@W I
@s
= 
@u
@s
+ h
@uh
@s| {z }
search e¢ ciency e¤ect <0
 g () @
@s| {z }
investment cost e¤ect <0
< 0:
We thus have:
Remark 2 For inspection goods, consumer and total welfare monotonically decrease in
search cost, in contrast to the result for experience goods.
26
For both inspection and experience goods, an increase in search cost leads to higher price
and hence to higher return for quality reputation because only h rms sell in period 2.
However, consumers can avoid the loss from a low-quality product for inspection goods but
not for experience goods. Thus, the marginal benet from increasing rm quality () due to
a higher s, for consumers and for social welfare, is lower for inspection than for experience
goods. This explains why a higher s can lead to higher consumer and social welfare through
the positive quality e¤ect for experience but not for inspection goods.
4.4 Equilibrium vs. E¢ cient Quality Investment
We further investigate how the equilibrium quality investment compares with the social
optimum, by comparing the cuto¤ values for quality investment (t) in these two cases. The
result below shows that the equilibrium cuto¤ (t) can be higher or lower than the e¢ cient
value (to) when search cost is su¢ ciently high or low, respectively.
Proposition 5 Given s 2 (0; s) ; there exists to > 0 that maximizes total welfare. Moreover,
provided to < t; there exists a unique  > 0 such that t  to if s   but t > to if  < s  s:
Proof. Recall @@t = (h   l) g (t) and @u@ = s2 11 F (u) : Thus,
@W 
@t
=
@ (u)
@
@
@t
  tg (t)
=

u +
s

1
1  F (u)

(h   l)  t

g (t) : (32)
Clearly @W

@t jt=0 > 0: Moreover, for given s > 0; u is bounded away from u: Thus, @W

@t < 0
if t is su¢ ciently high: Hence, there exists to 2 (0; x) such that W  is maximized at to:
Moreover, from (19), t increases in s and t ! t if s! s: Therefore, if to < t; there exists
a unique  such that t  to when s  ; and t > to when  < s  s:
An increase in t results in a higher proportion of rms that invest. This leads to a
higher expected quality of sellers and hence higher welfare in the rst period, as reected
by a higher u . On the other hand, investment is costly, and a higher t leads to higher
investment cost
R t
0 xdG (x). A socially optimal t
o balances these two opposing forces, with
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the marginal benet from a higher  being equal to the marginal cost of increasing t. From
the denition of t in (22), we note that t > 0 is independent of l whereas t
o ! 0 if l ! h:
Thus to < t is likely to hold when (h   l) is not too large so that the benet from high
quality (h) is more limited.
When s is low, consumers have strong search incentives and u is high, so that a higher
average rm quality (i.e. a higher t) is more socially desirable, leading to a higher u : But
price and hence t is low when s is low. Therefore t < to when s is low. On the other
hand, when s is high, u is low and welfare gain from increasing  is relatively low (so to is
relatively low), whereas price is high and t relatively high, so that t tends to exceed to:
In the existing literature on experience goods, product quality is usually ine¢ ciently low
because it is more costly to induce rms to improve quality when quality is not detectable
by consumers before purchase. Our result shows that this can be reversed in the presence
of search frictions.22
5. THE IMPACT OF AN INTERMEDIARY
In many markets, consumers search their products through an intermediary that serves
as a search platform, such as Amazon.com and booking.com. We now extend our model
to include such an intermediary.23 A prot-maximizing intermediary can a¤ect market
outcomes by charging sellers fees for being on its platform, which may in turn a¤ect the
(average) quality of sellers on the marketplace, search e¢ ciency, and market price.24
22 It can be veried that a similar result also holds for inspection goods. Thus, quality provision is socially
decient when s is low but possibly excessive when s is high, for both experience and inspection goods in
search markets.
23Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2011) study position auctions by search engines, empha-
sizing their benecial role as information intermediary. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) pioneered the study of
coordination economies in retail market search. Others have shown that search intermediaries need not
(optimally) improve search e¢ ciency (e.g. Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011; White, 2013; de Cornière and Taylor,
2014). None of the above analyze experience goods.
24 In addition to providing a search platform, the intermediary may publish product reviews by customers.
The intermediary can thus be a reputation carrier, enabling rms to establish quality reputation when
product reviews are otherwise unavailable.
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Suppose that the intermediary can charge each seller (k; ) ; where k  0 is a xed fee
and   0 is a percentage of the transaction price. Sellers that pay the fees will have
access to consumers associated with the intermediary. We further assume that there is a
minimum platform size 
 2 (0; 1] number of sellers to be listed on the platform that the
intermediary can commit to.25
The timing of the extended model is as follows. The intermediary rst chooses (k; ) :
In period 1, after its realization of x; each seller chooses whether to pay the fees to sell
on the platform and decides whether to invest x to become a seller with h. Sellers on
the platform then set prices, consumers sequentially search sellers on the platform, and
transactions are made. In period 2, consumer reviews from previous period are available to
the current cohort of consumers. Sellers on the platform set prices, and consumers again
sequentially search sellers on the platform and possibly make purchases. Everything else
about the model is the same as in section 2.26 Notice that sellers not on the platform are
not active in either period.
Given the average rm quality on the platform, ; which is endogenously determined by
the rms on the platform who will invest in h; the rmspricing and consumerssearch
strategies are the same as in section 4, una¤ected by the values of k and : In particular,
at a uniform-price equilibrium, the optimal consumer search rule is again given by (21),
whereas a seller will choose p to maximize (1  ) pD (p; p) ; the solution of which does not
depend on :
There are two possible types of equilibria for a given 
; depending on its value: (1) a
separating equilibrium in which all sellers on the platform are of high quality (h), and (2) a
pooling equilibrium in which both high and low quality sellers are present on the platform.
First, at a separating equilibrium, the intermediary charges high fees such that only high
quality sellers will be able to earn positive prot. Suppose that in equilibrium, there is
25A similar assumption is adopted by, for example, Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) under a continum of sellers,
or Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2011) under a ninte number of sellers.
26For convenience, we assume that each search still costs s. The analysis can be easily extended to
situations where s becomes lower when consumers search on the platform.
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a cuto¤ value tk such that only sellers with x  tk choose to invest in h and pay to be
listed on the platform while other sellers are o¤ the platform and inactive. In this case, in
equilibrium the intermediary solves the following problem (P1):
max
(k;)
	 = kG (tk) + h (uh) (1 + ) ;
subject to
(1  ) 1
G (tk)
h (uh)  k < 0; (33)
(1  ) 1
G (tk)
h (uh) (1 + )  k   x  0 for x  tk; (34)
where the rst constraint ensures that a seller with l has no incentive to be on the platform
(being able to sell only in period 1) and the second constraint ensures that sellers with low
x nd it protable to acquire h and sell on the platform.
Dene t
 and t^ respectively as
G (t
) = 
; t^ =
1
G
 
t^
h (uh) (1 + ) ; (35)
and, for t dened in (22), we assume max

t
; t^
	
< t < x: Then, exactly 
 rms will be
listed on the platform if and only if all rms with x  t
 pay (k; ) and invest x; whereas
G
 
t^

is the mass of rms who will acquire h and be on the platform if k =  = 0 and
 = h:
Lemma 1 Suppose t
  t^: There is a separating equilibrium in which the intermediary
optimally sets  = 0 and
k =
1
G (t
)
h (uh) (1 + )  t
; (36)
whereas only rms with x  t
 choose to acquire h and sell on the platform. Moreover,
the presence of the intermediary improves welfare if t
  t; with t dened in (19) and
t < t^ .
Proof. In equilibrium, constraint (34) is binding when x = tk and thus
(1  ) 1
G (tk)
h (uh) (1 + ) = k + tk:
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Hence,
	 = h (uh) (1 + )  tkG (tk) ;
which decreases in tk: Thus, the intermediary optimally sets (k; ) such that the rm with
x = t
 is indi¤erent between being on and o¤ the platform:
k = (1  ) 1
G (t
)
h
1  F (uh)
f (uh)
(1 + )  t
:
Moreover, substituting k into constraint (33), we have
 < t
G (t
)
1
h
f (uh)
1  F (uh) :
Therefore,  = 0 and k solve problem (P1) and induce the separating equilibrium, which
improves search e¢ ciency in period 1. If additionally t
  t; then the total investment
cost on quality is not higher in the separating equilibrium than in the equilibrium without
the intermediary, and hence social welfare must be higher in the former.
Given (relatively small) 
 so that t^  t
; the intermediary can screen out low quality
rms by charging high fees and thus organize a platform that contains only high quality
sellers. At this equilibrium, search e¢ ciency is higher in period 1 (and is unchanged in
period 2) as compared to the market equilibrium without the intermediary; if additionally
t
  t; then the total investment cost on quality is also (weakly) lower and hence social
welfare must be higher at the separating equilibrium.
We next consider an alternative possible equilibrium, a pooling equilibrium, which arises
when t
 > t^: In this equilibrium, there is a cuto¤ value tk such that only rms with x  tk
choose to acquire h, but all rms will pay to be on the platform. The intermediary solves
the following maximization problem (P2):
max
k;
	 = k +  [ (tk) (u) + h (uh)] ;
subject to
(1  )  (tk) (u)  k  0; (37)
(1  )  1
G (tk)
h (uh)  x  0 for x  tk; (38)
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where the two constraints ensure respectively that rms with l are willing to pay (k; )
and that rms with x  tk will additionally choose to acquire h. The result below refers
to condition

 (u)  0 (u) s

1
1  F (u)

(h   l)  t (39)
for  =  (t) ; which holds if (h   l) is not too large.
Lemma 2 Suppose t
 > t^ and (39) holds. Then, there exists a pooling equilibrium with
tk 2 (0; t). The intermediary optimally chooses
k = (1  )  (tk) (u) ;  = 1  tkG (tk)
1
h
 (uh) ;
and all rms choose to be on the platform. However, only rms with x  tk choose to
acquire h.
Proof. Constraint (38) is binding when x = tk; with
tk = (1  )  1
G (tk)
h (uh) : (40)
Since RHS of (40) decreases in tk and ; it follows that tk decreases in : In equilibrium,
(37) is binding. Moreover, from (40),
tkG (tk) = (1  ) h (uh) :
Thus, the intermediarys objective function becomes, for  =  (tk) ;
	 =  (tk) (u)  tkG (tk) + h (uh) : (41)
Since @u@ =
1
[1 F (u)]
s
2
and @@tk = (h   l) g (tk) ; we have
@	
@tk
=

 (u) + 
0 (u)
@u
@

@
@tk
 G (tk)  tkg (tk)
=

 (u)  0 (u) s

1
1  F (u)

(h   l) g (tk) G (tk)  tkg (tk)
=

 (u)  0 (u) s

1
1  F (u)

(h   l)  tk

g (tk) G (tk) : (42)
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Since 0 (u)  0; we have @	@tk jtk!0 > 0: Also, under (39),
@	
@tk
jtk!t < 0: Therefore, there
exists tk < t
 that maximizes 	; with  > 0:
When the minimum platform size 
 is relatively large and (h   l) relatively small,
there is a pooling equilibrium in which the intermediary nds optimal to accommodate
both high and low quality rms, with positive k and : Due to  > 0; however, tk < t

and the average rm quality in period 1 is lower than when the intermediary is absent. The
intermediary can thus lower welfare if it leads to a pooling equilibrium, because the market
provision of quality may be already too low without the intermediary.
Combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, noting t < t^ and recalling from Proposition 5 that
t < to if s < ; we have
Proposition 6 For the extended model with an intermediary, assume max

t
; t^
	
< t: (i)
If t
 < t^; then it is an equilibrium for rms with x  t
 to acquire h and be listed by the
intermediary, with the intermediary improving social welfare. (ii) If t
 > t^; then it is an
equilibrium for all rms to be listed by the intermediary but only those with x  tk < t to
acquire h; and if s < ; then t

k < t
 < to; so that the market provision of quality is further
below the social optimum.27
The presence of a prot-maximizing search intermediary can thus either increase or reduce
welfare. Notice that t
 < t is more likely to hold if s is relatively large, while t
 > t^
and s <  are more likely to hold if s is relatively small. Therefore, the presence of
the intermediary is more likely to increase welfare when the intermediary can commit to a
relatively small minimum listing size, or under relatively large search cost; but it can reduce
welfare when the minimum listing space on the search platform is relatively large or there
is relatively high search cost.28
27 In this case, social welfare, same as W  from (25), is likely but not necessarily lower under tk than
under t. If W  is monotonically increasing in t for t < to; which for example is true when F () and G ()
are uniform distributions, then W  is unambiguously lower under tk than under t
 if tk < t
 < to:
28We have not established the uniqueness of equilibrium in either case. Thus, this conclusion needs the
qualication that the separating and the pooling equilibrium will prevail respectively when t
 < t^ and when
t
 > t^:
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper has studied consumer search and price competition for experience goods. In
contrast to results for inspection goods, which has been the focus of the existing search
literature, we nd that a higher average rm quality tends to raise market price despite
intensifying search and competition; and, more strikingly, both consumer and social welfare
are initially increasing in search cost under endogenous rm quality and reputation. Our
results suggest that the observability of product quality (before purchase) plays an impor-
tant role for understanding how search markets function. We also nd that equilibrium rm
quality is ine¢ ciently low when search cost is small but can be excessively high when search
cost is relatively large. Moreover, if a search intermediary can commit to a relatively small
space to list sellers, it tends to improve welfare; otherwise it is likely to reduce welfare.
APPENDIX. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
The numerical example illustrates Proposition 4 (V  andW  change with s non-monotonically),
Proposition 5 (comparing t and to); and Proposition 6 (an intermediarys impact on wel-
fare).
Suppose that F (u) = u for u 2 [0;] : Given ; we haveZ 
u
(u  u) 1

du =
s

=) u =  
s
2s

, p =
p
2s:
Moreover, uh =   
q
2s
h
and ph =
p
2sh: Suppose G (x) = bx and g (x) = b for
x 2 [0; 1b ]: Then G (t) = bt;
 (t) = l + (h   l) bt:
From (19),
h (uh) = t
G (t) ; =) t =
  
22sh
0:5
b
!0:5
:
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Hence, with  =  (t) ;
 =
p
2s + 
p
2sh  
Z t
0
bxdx;
V  = 
 
  2
s
2s

!
+ h
 
  2
s
2s
h
!
;
W  = 
 
 
s
2s

!
+ h
 
 
s
2s
h
!
 
Z t
0
bxdx:
Let h = 0:8; l = 0:3;  = 0:8;  = 100;
1
b = 50: Figures 1A and 1B below show that
both V  and W  exhibit an inverted-U shape in s; illustrating Proposition 4:
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Figure 1B
We next illustrate Proposition 5. Let h = 0:8; l = 0:3;  = 0:8;  = 20 and
1
b = 100:
Note that from (32), to solves
@W 
@t
=
  
 
s
2s
 (t)
+
s
 (t)
1
1  u
!
(h   l)  t
!
b = 0:
We can show that there exists  = 0:04 such that t  to if s   but t > to if  < s:
Therefore, quality investment is decient (excessive) when s is small (large): For example,
if s = 0:03; t = 8: 853 5 < to = 9: 535 5; and if s = 0:05; t = 10: 059 > to = 9: 399 8:
We nally illustrate Proposition 6. Suppose s = 0:03 and 
 = 0:1: Then, from (35) and
(22), t
 = 10 < t^ = 13: 28 < t = 21: 363: In this case, social welfare with the intermediary
is
W  (t
) = h
 
 
s
2s
h
!
+ h
 
 
s
2s
h
!
 
Z t

0
bxdx = 26: 536;
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which is higher than welfare without the intermediary:
W  (t) =  (t)
 
 
s
2s
 (t)
!
+ h
 
 
s
2s
h
!
 
Z t
0
bxdx = 17: 867:
However, if 
 = 0:2 and thus t
 = 20 > t^; then from (42), tk solves
@	
@tk
=
240@s2s

+
s

q
2s

1A (h   l)  tk
35 b  b (tk) = 0
and tk = 7:45 38. Hence, we have t

k < t
 < to. In this case, social welfare in the presence
of the intermediary is
W  (tk) =  (t

k)
 
 
s
2s

 
tk
!+ h
 
 
s
2s
h
!
 
Z tk
0
bxdx = 17: 848:
Therefore, if t
 > t^; the intermediary reduces welfare by inducing an equilibrium quality
that is further below the social optimum.
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